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Abstract: In Bangladesh, the judiciary has adjudicated important political issues, particularly cases 
of constitutional amendments. On the other hand, the judiciary has been utterly politicised against a 
backdrop of deep-seated antagonism and mistrust between the two major political parties. Although 
the related literature tends to focus on either the judicialisation of politics or the politicisation of the 
judiciary alone, this paper argues that politicisation and judicialisation have coexisted and the 
relative importance of these two factors can change depending on the type of issue dealt with by the 
judiciary. Accordingly, this paper takes up the latest constitutional amendment case as an example, in 
which the Supreme Court struck down a significant constitutional change in the procedure for the 
removal of judges. In so doing, we demonstrate that, while judicial appointments had been deeply 
politicised for decades, judges across the political spectrum were very keen to uphold judicial 
autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch. However, as the current regime has become increasingly 
authoritarian after “landslide victories” in general elections in 2014 and 2018, it seems more likely 
that the politicisation (and possibly the subjugation) of the judiciary has played a dominant role in 
recent years. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing number of studies have documented the increasing significance tied to the role of the 
judiciary in politics in many parts of the world. Accordingly, the trend towards the “judicialisation of 
politics” (Hirschl 2006) has been recognised in the literature concerning Asia, and this is also the 
case with some countries in South Asia in particular (Dressel 2012). For example, Hoque (2015, 
266) states that the “judicialisation of politics has achieved a significant place within the higher 
judiciaries of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan—although in differing degrees and types.” For 
Bangladesh, he claims that the judicialisation of politics has recently reached a stage in which the 
judiciary intruded into “mega-politics” in an unprincipled and unpragmatic manner. This observation 
on the judiciary of Bangladesh appears quite reasonable, given that the Supreme Court has annulled 
four constitutional amendments since 2010. 
On the other hand, many legal scholars and practitioners have pointed out that in Bangladesh the 
executive branch has interfered in the judiciary, especially through judicial appointments, against a 
backdrop of deep-seated antagonism and mistrust between the two major political parties. More 
specifically, there is significant room for political discretion in elevating judges from the High Court 
Division (HCD) to the Appellate Division (AD) in the Supreme Court and in appointing the Chief 
Justice among judges of the AD (Bari 2016; Islam 2012; Jahan and Shahan 2014; Siddiq 2018)1. 
Therefore, judges have a strong incentive to act in accordance with the government’s wishes. 
The aim of this paper is to show that politicisation and judicialisation have coexisted and the 
relative importance of these two factors can change depending on the type of issue dealt with by the 
judiciary. While the related literature tends to focus on either politicisation of the judiciary or the 
judicialisation of politics alone, the judiciary of Bangladesh is not simply characterised by either 
politicisation or judicialisation (or a transition from the former to the latter). Therefore, this sort of 
dichotomous thinking is not appropriate when looking at the relationship between the executive and 
judicial branches. 
In this paper, we take up the example of the latest constitutional amendment case, which was 
about the procedure for the removal of judges (the Sixteenth Amendment Case). In doing so, we 
demonstrate that judges across the political spectrum were very keen to uphold judicial autonomy 
vis-à-vis the executive branch, notwithstanding its extensive interference in the judiciary. Combining 
different types of evidence—such as patterns of judicial appointments, a detailed insider account by 
a former Chief Justice (Sinha 2018), and the Supreme Court’s rulings and voting patterns of judges 
in major cases—we argue that it is possible to understand why the Supreme Court struck down the 
Sixteenth Amendment against the government’s wishes. However, as the current regime has become 
increasingly authoritarian after “landslide victories” in general elections in 2014 and 2018, it seems 
                                                   
1 The Supreme Court of Bangladesh consists of the HCD and the AD. The former is the lower 
division, and the Chief Justice belongs to the latter (Article 94 of the Constitution). 
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more likely that the politicisation (and possibly the subjugation) of the judiciary has played a 
dominant role in recent years. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes how constitutional provisions relating to 
the appointment and removal of Supreme Court judges have changed over time. Section 3 examines 
the politicisation of the judiciary through judicial appointments in the past few decades. In Section 4, 
we document and analyse the Supreme Court’s decisions about the Constitution (Sixteenth 
Amendment) Act of 2014. In Section 5, we discuss why the government did not have full control of 
the higher judiciary despite its interference in judicial appointments. The final section concludes 
with some thoughts on the future of the relationship between the judicial and executive branches in 
Bangladesh. 
 
 
2. Constitutional Provisions on the Appointment and Removal of Judges 
Provisions relating to the judiciary in the Constitution are in Part VI (titled “The Judiciary”), and that 
part is separated into Chapter I (titled “Supreme Court”) and Chapter II (titled “Subordinate Court”). 
Twenty provisions are contained in Chapter I and four provisions are in Chapter II. 
Among these provisions, Articles 95 and 96 are closely related to the Sixteenth Amendment. In 
this section, we will introduce these two provisions focusing on their transformation through several 
constitutional amendments. 
 
2.1. Article 95 
The original provision of Article 95 as enacted in 1972 was as follows; 
 
  (1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President, and the other Judges shall be appointed 
by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice. 
  (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge unless he is a citizen of Bangladesh 
and 
    (a) has, for not less than ten years, been an advocate of the Supreme Court; or 
    (b) has, for not less than ten years, held judicial office or been an advocate, in the territory of 
Bangladesh and has, for not less than three years, exercised the powers of a district Judge. 
  (3) In this article “Supreme Court” includes a court which at any time before the commencement 
of this Constitution exercised jurisdiction as a High Court in the territory of Bangladesh. 
 
This article was amended by the Fourth Amendment in 1975. The largest change was in clause 1 
which was amended to the following: 
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   (1) The Chief Justice and other judges shall be appointed by the President. 
 
This amendment means that consultation with the Chief Justice is no longer required for 
appointment of a Supreme Court judge. In other words, the amendment made it possible to appoint 
Supreme Court judges at the discretion of the President. The Fourth Amendment aimed to 
concentrate the power to the President by changing the governance system from a parliamentary 
system to a presidential system and considerably reducing the authority of the judicial branch and 
impairing its independence. As part of this, the provision that guaranteed the opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to be involved in the appointment of Supreme Court judges was removed from the 
Constitution. 
After that, according to the Fifth Amendment of 1979, the one-party system introduced by the 
Fourth Amendment was abolished and a certain degree of change was also seen with respect to the 
judiciary. However, the phrase “consultation with the Chief Justice” was restored in clause 1 and the 
system for the appointment of Supreme Court judges returned to its original form through the 
Fifteenth Amendment of 2011, which was made in response to a judgement that invalidated the Fifth 
Amendment. 
  In relation to this provision, one subclause introduced by the Fifth Amendment was (2) (c) of 
Article 95. This provides that one of the qualifications to be appointed as a Supreme Court judge is 
prescribed by law. However, a criticism is that this “law” has not been enacted to date, so this 
provision might lead to discretionary appointments. 
  The Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment abolished the Non-Party Caretaker Government (NCG) 
system that had been in effect up to that time, and also revised provisions related to fundamental 
rights and the governance system in various aspects of the Constitution. It was one of the 
amendments that brought about major changes in the constitutional history of Bangladesh. 
 
2.2. Article 96 
Article 96 provides the term of office of the Chief Justice and other Supreme Court judges, and is a 
provision that was more greatly changed by the constitutional amendment compared with Article 95. 
The current provisions enacted by the Sixteenth Amendment of 2014 are as follows; 
 
  (1) Subject to the other provisions of this article, a judge shall hold office until he attains the age 
of sixty-seven years. 
  (2) A Judge shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President passed 
pursuant to a resolution of Parliament supported by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the 
total number of members of Parliament, on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. 
  (3) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure in relation to a resolution under clause (2) and 
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for investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge. 
  (4) A judge may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President. 
 
  Looking at the changes in the text, clause 1 of the original Constitution specified a retirement age 
of sixty-two years old. Then, by the Seventh Amendment of 1986, the retirement age was raised to 
sixty-five years old, and was raised again to the age of sixty-seven by the Fourteenth Amendment in 
2004.  
  The original provisions of clauses 2 and 3 were same as the current ones. However, the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution revoked clause 3 and changed clause 2 as follows; 
 
  (2) A Judge may be removed from his office by order of the President on the ground of 
misbehaviour or incapacity: 
Provided that no judge shall be removed until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of 
showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.  
 
In other words, Parliament lost control over the dismissal procedure of judges. Furthermore, when 
we read it together with Article 95, it is clear that the President was granted the power to appoint and 
dismiss judges by the Fourth Amendment. However, these provisions were changed again by the 
Fifth Constitutional Amendment to the following: 
 
  (2) A Judge shall not be removed from office except in accordance with the following provisions 
of this article. 
  (3) There shall be a Supreme Judicial Council, in this article referred to as the Council, which 
shall consists of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, and the two next senior Judges: 
  Provided that if, at any time, the Council is inquiring into the capacity or conduct of a judge who 
is a member of the Council, or a member of the Council is absent or is unable to act due to illness 
or other cause, the Judge who is next in seniority to those who are members of the Council shall 
act as such member. 
 
  This amendment was one factor in restoring judicial independence. This is because a new 
framework was established in which the Supreme Judicial Council plays an important role in the 
dismissal of judges. Furthermore, the provisions of clauses 4 to 7, which were added as a result of 
the Fifth Amendment, are as follows; 
 
  (4) The functions of the Council shall be- 
    (a) to prescribe a Code of Council to be observed by the Judges; and 
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    (b) to inquire the capacity or conduct of a Judge or of any other functionary who is not 
removable from office except in like manner as a Judge. 
  (5) Where, upon any information received from the Council or from any other source, the 
President has reason to apprehend that a Judge- 
    (a) may have ceased to be capable of properly performing the functions of his office by reason 
of physical or mental incapacity, or 
    (b) may have been guilty of gross misconduct, the President may direct the Council to inquire 
into the matter and report its finding. 
  (6) If, after making the inquiry, the Council reports to the President that in its opinion the Judge 
has ceased to be capable of properly performing the functions of his office or has been guilty of 
gross misconduct, the President shall, by order, remove the Judge from office. 
  (7) For the purpose of an inquiry under this article, the Council shall regulate its procedure and 
shall have, in respect of issue and execution of processes, the same power as the Supreme Court. 
  (8) A Judge may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President.   
 
  However, as a result of the Sixteenth Amendment, clauses 2 and 3 became current provisions (i.e. 
the repeal of these provisions was reversed to restore the original), and the framework of the 
Supreme Judicial Council was deleted as the provisions of clauses 4 to 7 were replaced by clause 3. 
In other words, the scope of the judiciary’s involvement in the dismissal of judges has been 
narrowed, and the dismissal of judges for political reasons has become a possibility.  
 
2.3. Other provisions 
Some other provisions were also amended in addition to Articles 95 and 96. For example, Article 98 
provides for the appointment of HCD judges as ad hoc judges for the AD. Originally, consultation 
with the Chief Justice was required. However, with the Fourth Amendment, the phrase “consultation 
with the Chief Justice” was removed. Article 100 was also once amended, but unlike the case of 
Article 98, this provision was amended again and restored to its original wording. 
  As described above, several provisions have been amended in relation to political circumstances. 
Among them, Articles 95 and 96 were most strongly affected by the politico-judicial relationship. 
The Sixteenth Amendment was one of these cases. 
 
 
3. Politicisation of Judicial Appointments 
The independence of the judiciary is one of the basic pillars of the Constitution of Bangladesh, but in 
reality, judicial appointments have been utterly politicised over the past few decades. This has 
occurred against a backdrop of deep-seated antagonism and mistrust between the two major political 
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parties—the Awami League (AL), led by Sheikh Hasina, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP), led by Khaleda Zia. 
Many legal scholars and practitioners have observed that notwithstanding Articles 95 (1) and 48 
(3) of the Constitution, it is not the President but the Prime Minister who selects the Chief Justice of 
Bangladesh (Bari 2016; Islam 2012; Jahan and Shahan 2014; Siddiq 2018). A former Chief Justice, 
recalling the selection process of one of his predecessors, candidly says that although the 
Constitution empowered the President to appoint the Chief Justice, the Prime Minister had full 
authority over the matter. He also argues that “[t]he office of Chief Justice was made political for a 
long time and it was beyond comprehension that anyone would become the Chief Justice outside the 
political line of thinking” (Sinha 2018, chapters 6 and 10). 
In the same vein, appointments of other judges of the Supreme Court have also been made with 
political considerations. There is a common perception that when in power, both the AL and the BNP 
regularly attempted to elevate judges who shared their partisan interests and political views 
(Chowdhury 2015, 223-224; Jahan and Shahan 2014, 227). As a result, according to a former Chief 
Justice, various benches of the Supreme Court were divided along political lines like an “Awami 
League Court” and a “BNP Court” (Rahman 2011). After the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment in 
2011, the President is obliged to consult the Chief Justice on appointments of puisne judges, but this 
would not make much difference given that the executive branch handpicks the Chief Justice. In fact, 
as far as we know, the Chief Justice was even ignored in some cases.2 
  The sheer politicisation of judicial appointments can be seen from the fact that supersession has 
recently been the rule rather than the exception in Bangladesh. This stands in contrast to India, where 
seniority is arguably the single most important unwritten norm in the judiciary (Chandrachud 2014, 
11).3 Between 1972 and 2002, twelve AD judges assumed the office of the Chief Justice of 
Bangladesh, and there was no instance of departure from the seniority principle. Since 2003, in 
marked contrast to the preceding thirty years, seven of ten AD judges who assumed the office of the 
Chief Justice superseded senior colleagues of the AD including the senior-most judges (Table 1). It 
was the BNP government (October 2001-October 2006) that, for the first time since independence, 
violated the convention of appointing the senior-most AD judge as the Chief Justice in June 2003, 
                                                   
2 In 2013, the President elevated a judge of the HCD to the AD without any consultation with the 
Chief Justice (Sinha 2018, chapter 10). Another case saw an additional judge dropped in 2014, 
though the Chief Justice recommended his confirmation as a permanent judge of the HCD (Siddiq 
2018, 65). 
3 Since independence, the seniority norm has been followed in the appointment of the Chief Justice 
of India, barring three exceptions more than four decades ago. When it comes to appointing judges 
to the Supreme Court of India, seniority is an informal eligibility criterion taken into account 
(Chandrachud 2014, 212). On the other hand, the collegium system has recently come under fire for 
its arbitrariness, opacity, and lack of accountability. See Siddiq (2018); “The collegium system must 
be reformed,” Hindustan Times, 17 January 2019; “Hollowing out of judiciary,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, 54 (4), 26 January 2019. 
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when K. M. Hasan assumed the office in supersession of two fellow judges.4 During the BNP 
regime, the next Chief Justice, Syed J. R. Mudassir Husain, also superseded the same senior judges. 
It is important to note that, even before this, judicial appointments were politicised. As shown in 
Table 2, the BNP government (March 1991-June 1996) had already breached the seniority principle 
in appointing AD judges, and the succeeding AL government (June 1996-July 2001) went even 
further. While two of three judges elevated to the AD superseded fellow HCD judges during the BNP 
government, six of seven judges elevated to the AD superseded senior colleagues of the HCD during 
the AL government.5 In appointing AD judges, supersession of the senior-most HCD judges has 
been quite common under all the successive regimes: the BNP government (October 2001-October 
2006), the military-backed NCG (January 2007-December 2008), and the AL government (January 
2009-present). Given that the number of judges superseded by junior colleagues has skyrocketed in 
recent years, the present AL government seems to have made more blatantly arbitrary decisions on 
judicial appointments. It elevated judges to the AD who it had appointed (or confirmed) to the HCD 
after coming back to power in 2009, and they superseded a group of HCD judges appointed by the 
BNP government between 2001 and 2006.6 In fact, in a great majority of cases since 2002, both the 
BNP and AL governments appointed judges to the AD whom they had previously elevated to the 
HCD (Table 2). 
Figure 1 illustrates the composition of AD judges between 1991 and 2018. Since February 2010, 
the AD has consisted of only judges appointed by the AL government. In addition to those judges, 
there has been at least one judge appointed by the AL in the AD over the past 20 years, including the 
period when it lost power. It appears that the AL government and, to a lesser extent, the BNP 
government have been keen to appoint relatively younger judges to the AD, who would then have 
longer tenures (see the fourth column of Table 2) and, in doing so, both the governments have tried 
to keep a grip on the high court even after losing power. This forward-looking step would be another 
reason for the prevalence of supersession in the higher judiciary. 
  It is also worth pointing out that while the Constitution does not stipulate the size of the Supreme 
                                                   
4 The retirement age of Supreme Court judges was raised from 65 to 67 years by the Constitution 
(Fourteenth Amendment) Act of 2004. It was alleged that this extension of retirement age was 
politically motivated to make K. M. Hasan, who previously served as the International Affairs 
Secretary of the BNP, the Chief Advisor of an NCG (Islam 2016, 48-49). In October 2006, Justice 
Hasan declined to assume the role of Chief Advisor, which led to the two-year rule of the 
military-backed NCG. 
5 In 2001, for example, Md. Ruhul Amin and Mohammad Fazlul Karim were elevated to the AD in 
supersession of the aforementioned K. M. Hasan, who later became the Chief Justice superseding 
Amin and Karim, in return. 
6  AHM Shamsuddin Choudhury, Md. Nizamul Huq, and Mohammad Bazlur Rahman were 
confirmed as permanent judges of the HCD in 2009, after serving as additional judges for no less 
than 8 years. Obviously, the BNP government (2001-2006) and the military-backed NCG 
(2007-2008) blocked their confirmation. 
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Court, the number of AD judges has increased only marginally over the years. Therefore, a single 
judge can carry much weight in the AD, and this gives the government a strong incentive to appoint 
those who are committed to their partisan interests as AD judges in general and as Chief Justice in 
particular.7 On the other hand, the size of the HCD has increased steadily and more than tripled 
during the same period: 28, 48, and 97 judges in 1991, 2003, and 2015, respectively (Supreme Court 
of Bangladesh 2016, 112). This puts the government in a better position to find favourable judges in 
the HCD for elevation to the AD not just because the pool of candidates has become bigger, but 
because more competition for promotion among HCD judges could tempt them further to act in 
favour of the government. 
As we will see later, however, this politicisation of judicial appointments does not mean that 
judges always make decisions in a partisan way (i.e. in favour of the political party that appointed 
them), no matter which party holds the reins. Nor does it mean that judges are always subservient to 
the powers-that-be due to their carrot-and-stick approach. In the following sections, we illustrate that 
the reality is more complicated and nuanced, with special reference to the Sixteenth Amendment 
Case. 
 
 
4. The Sixteenth Amendment Case 
The Sixteenth Amendment of the Constitution of Bangladesh was passed in September 2014 and was 
a change that empowered Parliament with respect to the dismissal of Supreme Court judges. 
However, in response to the amendment, the Supreme Court ruled against a writ petition under 
Article 102 of the Constitution that contested its constitutionality, and after the ruling that the 
amendment was unconstitutional by the HCD on May 5, 2016, the judgement of the HCD was 
upheld by the AD on July 3, 2017. 
In this section, we will examine the contents of the judgement that the Sixteenth Amendment was 
unconstitutional by the HCD. In examining the judgement, we will focus on the majority opinion of 
Justice Moyeenul Islam Chowdhury. Later on, the criticisms contained in Chief Justice Surendra 
Kumar Sinha’s dissent in this case caused conflict between the political establishment and the 
judicial branch. However, since the important matters were already mentioned in the judgement of 
the HCD, this section will focus on the majority opinion by the HCD. 
 
4.1. Main claims of the plaintiff and respondent 
                                                   
7 The size of the Supreme Court of India is now fixed at 31 (including the Chief Justice) by Article 
124 (1) of the Constitution with the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2008. 
Chandrachud (2014, 162) argues that the large size of the Supreme Court of India creates a greater 
diffusion of power amongst the judges. 
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The plaintiff firstly argued that persons who have political influence tend to ignore the law for their 
own interests in Bangladesh as compared with countries such as India. 
Then, the plaintiff also argued that the Sixteenth Amendment, which gave Parliament the authority 
to make recommendations to the President on the dismissal of judges, contradicted the principle of 
separation of powers included in the preamble of the Constitution. Also, it infringed on the basic 
structure of the Constitution and violated Article 7B. In addition, the plaintiff criticised this 
amendment for violating the spirit of Article 22, which clarified the separation between the 
administrative and judiciary branches. In addition, as stipulated in Article 70 (b), members of 
Parliament are unable to vote against the decisions of their political party, so it is a problem that they 
are unable to freely express opinions on the dismissal of judges. 
In response to the plaintiff's argument, Attorney General Mr. Mahbubey Alam and others 
expressed the following opinion as counsel to the respondent. First of all, while touching on the 
scandals of judges reported on the media, they argued that it is generally accepted that the Supreme 
Judicial Council was not functioning, and that the Sixteenth Amendment improved governance in the 
judicial branch (pp. 11-12: hereinafter, number indicates page number of the judgement). They also 
argued that the amendment does not conflict with the preamble of the Constitution or Article 7B. 
As for Article 70, Mahbubey Alam argued that the dismissal of judges is not a political issue, and 
that it would not be a problem because Parliament will discuss constitutional issues regardless of 
political beliefs. (12-15). Furthermore, Article 7 stipulates that all of the country’s power belongs to 
the people, and exercise thereof is said to be on behalf of the people. Such sovereignty of the people 
is reflected in the provisions on impeachment of the President, the chairman of Parliament, and 
others in Articles 52, 57, 74, and 96. It was argued that because the government under martial law 
tried to dismiss a judge through the Supreme Judicial Council the military government, in a sense, 
robbed the sovereignty of the people (17-18).  
In this case, the four senior lawyers nominated by the court expressed their views as "friends of 
the court" (amicus curiae). One of them, Kamal Hossain, who served as Minister of Justice and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and also as the chairperson of the drafting committee of the 1972 
Constitution, mentioned that the independence of the judiciary is Constitution (e.g. Article 22). In 
Masdar Hossain’s , he argued that the AD emphasised the independence of the judiciary, in addition 
to such independence being mentioned in Articles 94(4), 116A, and 147. Furthermore, independence 
of the judiciary in particular means independence from intervention by the legislature, and when the 
Constitution was first enacted, it stipulated that Parliament is involved in the dismissal procedure of 
judges, but it does not mention such a role for political parties (38-40).  
In addition, Article 96 of the original Constitution was amended by the Fourth Amendment, and 
the organisation called the Supreme Judicial Council was introduced by the Fifth Amendment, after 
which the AD judged the Fifth Amendment as unconstitutional. Since the provision related to the 
11 
 
Supreme Judiciary Council was approved, it was said that the Sixteenth Amendment infringes on the 
judgment of the AD, weakens the independence of the judiciary, and adversely affects the rule of law. 
In addition, it was also pointed out that the Sixteenth Amendment conflicted with Article 147 (2) (41 
- 43). 
Lastly, Kamal Hossain gave the criticism that while partisanship affects the impeachment 
procedure in the United States, considering Bangladesh's current political situation in particular, the 
Sixteenth Amendment would threaten judicial independence due to the existence of Article 70 
(43-44). 
 
4. 2. Judgment 
The trial was handled by three judges: Moyeenul Islam Chowdhury, Quazi Reza-Ul Hoque, and Md. 
Ashraful Kamal. In this section, we focus on the majority opinion written by Justice Chowdhury. 
Incidentally, while Justice Hoque agreed with the majority opinion of Justice Chowdhury, Justice 
Kamal is said to have changed his mind at the last minute8.  
 
4.2.1. Locus standi 
One of the issues presented by the Attorney General was that the plaintiff did not have standing to 
raise a writ petition in this case, showing that "who is infringed on the right" prescribed in Article 
102 of the Constitution, is not clearly defined and is not bound by the traditional concept of locus 
standi, but should be interpreted according to the purpose and framework of the Constitution (58). 
Regarding this point, while referring to the so-called Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers 
Association (BELA) Case and the Ekushey Television Case, it was argued that judicial review is the 
core of the judicial branch under the Constitution of Bangladesh and that the scope of judicial review 
spreads on the basis of judicial activism, although there are certain restrictions (59-63).  
In consideration of the above discussion, it is obvious that the plaintiff is a lawyer in the Supreme 
Court with a high awareness of the public interest, and is concerned with the establishment of the 
rule of law. Moreover, if we have to establish the rule of law as the idea of the Constitution, even if 
the plaintiff has not been directly or personally affected by the Sixteenth Amendment, there is an 
interest of sufficient appeal as a lawyer (63-64). Then, after considering that the problem of the 
                                                   
8 Since Justice Hoque complained that an army officer had pressured him to deliver a judgment in 
favor of the government, it is quite presumable that Justice Kamal was also threatened and (unlike 
Justice Hoque) bent to the government’s will (Sinha 2018, chapter 27). Interestingly, the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Kamal was in Bangla (or Bengali). While it is the state language of Bangladesh, it 
is quite unusual that for a Supreme Court judge justice writes to write an opinion in Bangla. Justice 
Kamal, praising the state language, argued why his opinion must be written in Bangla. Given that 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh and the father of Sheikh Hasina, played 
a major role in the Bengali Language Movement in East Pakistan, Justice Kamal’s opinion was quite 
pro-AL in another sense. 
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separation of powers presented by the plaintiff and judicial independence are matters of interest to 
society, the plaintiff to standing. Based on Article 102 of the Constitution, this case could proceed 
under the framework of a writ petition (65-67). 
 
4.2.2. Parliament's involvement in judicial dismissal 
The procedures for dismissing judges are diverse within British Commonwealth countries, and about 
63% of these countries and regions have dismissed judges without involvement of the legislature. 
Because of this, Justice Chowdhury mentions that involving Parliament in the dismissal procedure of 
a judge is not mainstream within the British federal state. And Justice Chowdhury mentions many 
countries are sensitive to the separation of powers and judicial independence under such 
circumstance (67-76). 
 
4.2.3. Basic Structures of the Constitution and Independence of the judiciary 
In his opinion, a relatively large number of pages are allocated for the basic structure doctrine of the 
Constitution and independence of the judiciary. First, Justice Chowdhury said that a judge must 
exercise the sovereignty of the people under the Constitution, because the judges of the Supreme 
Court are "defenders of the Constitution" (77-78). Even though the Constitution does not contain any 
provision that the judiciary is accountable to Parliament, it has been argued that the Sixteenth 
Amendment would make the judiciary accountable to Parliament. Furthermore, unlike the British 
Parliament, the Bangladeshi Parliament does not prevail over anything, and Chowdhury stated that 
legislation should not infringe on the constitutional text and the basic structure (78-79). 
  Justice Chowdhury, while referring to the fact that the "rule of law" is also touched upon in the 
preamble of the Constitution, states that the concept is a basic principle of the Bangladeshi 
Constitution. He also mentions that the "law" that this refers to is not limited to the law made by the 
Parliament. He states that a prerequisite for the "rule of law" is independent and fair justice (pages 
79-80). From Article 147, which provided a guarantee for the treatment of judges, and Article 94 (4), 
which provided for independence of the judiciary in the performance of its duties, the founders of 
the Constitution of Bangladesh declared that the executive and legislative branches would not touch 
acts of judges (84-85).  
  From the case of Muhammad Abdul Haque vs. Fazlul Quader Chowdhury in 1963 before the 
Dhaka High Court, the concept of the basic structure of the Constitution was introduced, and the 
historical development was reflected in the Constitution of Bangladesh. It is said that a major 
position is placed on the Eighth Amendment judgment9, which acknowledged the basic structure of 
the Constitution. In the same ruling, it is stated that the basic structure of the Constitution, such as 
                                                   
9 Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, 1989 BLD (Spl.)1. 
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the separation of powers, democracy, republicanism, and independence of the judiciary, and so forth. 
Justice Chowdhury mentions that constitutional amendments are meant to make the Constitution 
better, effective, and meaningful, while maintaining its basic structure. The court pointed out that it 
has the authority to invalidate any constitutional amendment that would alter this structure (90-99). 
  In addition, Justice Chowdhury said that the judiciary must have an independent environment so 
that judges can judge freely, without external interference or pressure; and the independence of the 
judiciary is based on the rule of law as a cornerstone for the constitutional democratic state 
(100-109). Then, after listing the provisions of the Constitution concerning this case, Justice 
Chowdhury argued that the Constitution must be protected from any attack by the executive branch 
or the legislature, and since judicial independence is one of the basic structures of the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court must protect and defend it at any cost (114-121). 
 
4.2.4. Opinion on trial 
Next, Justice Chowdhury considered opinions from amicus curiae. For example, Chowdhury shows 
support for Hossain's opinion that judicial independence will be threatened by exposure of the 
judiciary to the Supreme Court dismissal procedure involving Parliament, which tends to be 
influenced by political pressure (121 -123). 
  The respondent noted that Parliament is involved in the dismissal procedure of judges in some 
countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and India. However, according to Article 
70 of the Constitution in Bangladesh, members of Parliament must follow the instructions of 
political parties on the dismissal of judges (123-124). Justice Chowdhury also pointed out that in 
Bangladesh, the executive branch refers to the appointment procedure of these countries despite the 
fact that these countries focus on the appointment, rather than the dismissal, of judges.  
  Justice Chowdhury also stated that, in considering the constitutional conformity of the Sixteenth 
Amendment, it is impossible to ignore the political situation of Bangladesh, such as (1) the lack of 
agreement on national issues among major parties, (2) the large degree of polarisation in society, and 
(3) the inability of any party to gain two-thirds of the seats in Parliament, which would be required 
for Parliament to stop dismissal procedure against a judge. From these political circumstances, the 
Sixteenth Amendment precludes the judiciary from fulfilling its duties with confidence (126-127).  
  Moreover, Justice Chowdhury upheld the plaintiff’s argument that the authority to dismiss a judge 
granted to Parliament by the Sixteenth Amendment is neither legislative authority nor supervisory 
authority over administrative activity, but ultra vires. He also upheld the argument that this 
amendment violates the philosophy of Article 22 of the Constitution. Furthermore, he also noted that 
details in the law on the dismissal of Supreme Court judges could be easily changed under Article 96 
(3) by a simple majority of Parliament, which in turn infringes on the independence of the judiciary 
(130-132). 
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  Regarding the independence of the judiciary, Justice Chowdhury assumed that there are three 
aspects: guarantee of term, guarantee of treatment, and institutional independence. Among them, the 
Sixteenth Amendment affects the guarantee of term of office, which is said to be related to the core 
of independence. In addition, Justice Chowdhury made a critical argument in connection with the 
independence of the judiciary, within the context that many members of the legislature have a history 
of crime or become a party to civil petitions. If such politicians were to be positioned superior to 
judges under the Sixteenth Amendment, then the independence of victims would be violated and the 
enforcement of judicial duties would be in danger (136-138). Furthermore, he concluded that the 
Sixteenth Amendment would lead to infringement of the public interest, and adopted the idea that the 
purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to destroy the concept of an independent Judiciary. He 
further mentioned that the proposed legislation based on Article 96(3) violated the independence of 
the judiciary along with the Sixteenth Amendment (141-143). 
  According to Justice Chowdhury, by passing the Sixteenth Amendment, the government was 
attempting to control the judicial system through Parliament, and this would influence judicial 
independence and the separation of powers, which are basic structures of the Constitution, and 
therefore dismissed the arguments made by the government (145-146 and 151). 
  Then, referring to the judgment of unconstitutionality by the Supreme Court of India against the 
99th Amendment of the Indian Constitution concerning the appointment of judges in India, Justice 
Chowdhury noted that the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers are dependent 
on the involvement of judges in the dismissal procedure (151-161). Lastly, he pointed out that the 
Sixteenth Amendment had no underlying legitimate intention (162-163). From the above discussion, 
Judge Chowdhury stated that the Sixteenth Amendment infringed on the basic structure of the 
Constitution, the independence of the judiciary, and the separation of powers. 
 
4.3. Judgment in the AD 
After judgment by the HCD was delivered on 5 May 2016, several politicians criticised the judgment. 
The government appealed to the AD and sought to overturn the HCD’s judgment. However, contrary 
to the government’s expectation, the AD ruled the Sixteenth Amendment unconstitutional on 3 July 
2017. Chief Justice Surendra Kumar Sinha wrote a long opinion full of criticism toward the political 
culture of the country. His opinion mainly upheld Justice Chowdhury’s. However, Chief Justice 
Sinha’s strong criticisms led to conflict with the political establishment, and he was eventually 
forced to leave the country and resign as Chief Justice.10 
                                                   
10 See “PM critical of CJ’s remarks,” The Daily Star, 22 August 2017; “AL leaders now calling for 
CJ to step down,” The Daily Star, 23 August 2017; “I am completely well, says Chief Justice SK 
Sinha as he leaves country,” The Daily Star, 13 October 2017; “Chief justice steps down,” The Daily 
Star, 12 November 2017; “Forced to quit: BNP, No pressure: AL,” The Daily Star, 12 November 
2017. See also Sinha (2018). 
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5. Between Politicisation and Judicialisation 
In Bangladesh, as discussed earlier, the executive branch has had great and non-transparent 
discretion in appointing judges to the Supreme Court, and consequently the selection process has 
become deeply politicised. This is especially true of the relationship between the higher judiciary 
and the current AL government, which has retained power over a decade and become increasingly 
authoritarian in recent years. Nevertheless, these observations seem to contradict the fact that the 
Supreme Court has made a number of major judgments unfavourable to successive governments, 
including that in the Sixteenth Amendment Case mentioned above. In the latest case, the 
constitutional amendment was struck down by a 2-1 decision (practically a 3-0 decision, as 
described in footnote 8) of the HCD and subsequently by a unanimous (7-0) decision of the AD. This 
is all the more puzzling, given that the seven AD judges who heard the case had been appointed to 
the AD by the AL government. 
How can we understand this seemingly wide gap? We argue that there are mainly two reasons why 
the executive branch did not have full control of the Supreme Court, despite its political interference 
in judicial appointments. First, judges across the political spectrum were very keen to uphold judicial 
autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch. Needless to say, there is no denying that the high court had 
self-serving purposes in dealing with the issue of the judicial independence. At the same time, it is 
indisputable that a number of legal decisions helped safeguard the autonomy of the judges and the 
judiciary from executive interference. They include landmark judgements in the Anwar Hossain 
Case (the Eighth Amendment Case), the Masdar Hossain Case, and the so-called Ten Judges Case 
(the case of Bangladesh v. Idrisur Rahman), among many others.11 
Concerning the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary and their removal, the Supreme 
Court’s judgement in the Fifth Amendment Case is also well worth mentioning. In August 2005, the 
HCD declared unconstitutional the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act of 1979, which was 
intended to grant constitutional protection to the martial-law regime, its actions, and laws (during the 
period between August 20, 1975 and April 9, 1979) by inserting a new paragraph in the Fourth 
Schedule to the Constitution. The AD unanimously upheld the HC’s decision with some 
modifications in February 2010.12 Interestingly, although the Supreme Court struck down most of 
the constitutional changes, it did validate some changes, including the amendment to Article 96, 
which introduced a new provision pertaining to the Supreme Judicial Council. Without convincingly 
explaining the rationale behind its selectivity, the AD claimed that “[t]his substituted provisions 
being more transparent procedure than that of the earlier ones and also safeguarding independence of 
                                                   
11 For the first two cases, see Hossain (2010). The Ten Judges Case concerned non-confirmation of 
ten additional judges to the HCD despite the recommendations of the Chief Justice. 
12 Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Ltd. v. Bangladesh, (2006) BLT (Special) (HCD)1; Khondkher 
Delwar Hossain v. Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Ltd., (2010) 62 DLR (AD) 298. 
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judiciary, are to be condoned.” It also demanded that the Supreme Court regain its power in 
appointment to and control and discipline of subordinate courts: “It is our earnest hope that Articles 
115 and 116 of the Constitution will be restored to their original position by the Parliament as soon 
as possible.”13 
Second, although the government had enormous power in judicial appointments of the Supreme 
Court, not only partisan interests and political ideologies of judges but other factors like external 
pressure and lobbying could matter. Therefore, judges would be selected who were neither pliable 
nor favourable to the ruling party. Among judges of this type, a noticeable example is Md. Abdul 
Wahhab Miah, who served as an AD judge from 2011 to 2018. The AL government was reluctant to 
elevate Justice Miah from the HCD to the AD even though there were only three judges on the AD, 
including the Chief Justice. This reluctance was due to the fact that he was not aligned with the 
political ideology of the AL and had close relations with lawyers affiliated with the BNP. At the same 
time, the AL government was afraid that if the senior-most judge of the HCD was superseded and 
junior judges were elevated to the AD instead, “there might be a commotion in the Supreme Court 
Bar,” given his connections with and popularity among the pro-BNP lawyers. Meanwhile, Justice 
Miah was actively canvassing and lobbying for his own elevation.14 For example, he approached the 
Law Minister and asked him to persuade the Prime Minister, and in February 2011, Justice Miah was 
appointed to the AD in accordance with the seniority norm (Sinha 2018, chapter 6). However, in 
February 2018, three months after Surendra Kumar Sinha was forced to resign as Chief Justice, he 
left the Supreme Court before retirement because Syed Mahmud Hossain was appointed as the new 
Chief Justice in supersession of Justice Miah, the senior-most AD judge. This incident corroborates 
the claim that Justice Miah had not been in line with the political thinking of the AL. 
The appointment of Mohammad Fazlul Karim as the Chief Justice is another example illustrating 
that the government did not always have the freedom to appoint judges who were committed to its 
partisan interests and political views. Justice Karim was “against [the] political thinking of the 
Awami League,” but his lobbying efforts paid off and an important Member of Parliament from the 
same region managed to convince Prime Minister Hasina to elevate him to Chief Justice. In February 
2010, after assuring the Law Minister that he would never embarrass the government during his 
                                                   
13 Khondkher Delwar Hossain v. Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Ltd. (2010) 62 DLR (AD) 298. 
In the original Constitution, consultation with the Supreme Court was required in appointing judges 
of subordinate courts (Article 115), and it was empowered to handle the posting, promotion, and 
granting of leave of those judges (Article 116). Nevertheless, the jurisdiction was transferred to the 
President by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution in 1975. Article 115 has remained the same 
since then, and Article 116 has not been fully restored to the original form, though it was amended 
again by the Fifth Amendment in 1979. The hypocrisy of the AL government is very clear here: 
while it justified the Sixteenth Amendment as the restoration of the original Article 96 of the 
Constitution, it ignored Articles 115 and 116. 
14 In India, judges canvass and lobby for appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts, and 
these activities continue under the collegium system as well (Chandrachud 2018, 209-213). 
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tenure, Justice Karim assumed the highest judicial post in the land (Sinha 2018, chapter 6).15 
To elaborate on the discussion above, we compare the Sixteenth Amendment Case with the 
Thirteenth Amendment Case. In the latter case, the AD declared illegal the Constitution (Thirteenth 
Amendment) Act of 1996, which introduced the NCG system. An NCG was an interim government 
set up following the expiry of the constitutionally stipulated five-year tenure of the Parliament, and it 
“shall give to the Election Commission all possible aid and assistance that may be required for 
holding the general election of members of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially” (Article 
58D (2) of the Constitution). It was composed of the Chief Advisor at its head and not more than ten 
other Advisors. Retired Chief Justices, the most recent of whom were first on the list, were eligible 
for the post of the Chief Advisor. Under the NCG system, general elections were successfully held in 
1996, 2001, and 2008, and the incumbent government was defeated every time.16 However, after the 
AD declared the Thirteenth Amendment unconstitutional in 2011, the ruling AL hastily pushed a 
constitutional amendment removing the NCG provisions (Articles 58B-58E) from the Constitution. 
This caused the BNP, which had only ever demanded parliamentary elections under an NCG rather 
than a party government, to boycott the general election held in January 2014. 
The cases of the Thirteenth Amendment and Sixteenth Amendment are similar in some respects. 
For example, they were heard during the AL government, and all the judges were ones appointed to 
the AD (and also to the HCD) by the AL government (Table 3). The AD annulled the constitutional 
amendments through the application of the basic structure doctrine.17 Moreover, the AL government 
allegedly intruded into both cases. 
In the Thirteenth Amendment Case, the AD allegedly acted on behalf of the government, which 
had wanted to discard the NCG system when in power.18 There were indeed many pieces of 
circumstantial evidence for the alleged collusion (or at least a tacit agreement) between the 
government and a section of the AD (Bari 2016, 46-51; Hoque 2015, 280-283; Siddiq 2018, 81). 
First, after A. B. M. Khairul Haque was appointed Chief Justice in September 2010, the AD started 
to hear an appeal against the HCD’s judgement on the amendment, even though it had been pending 
                                                   
15 In December 2016, the BNP submitted to the President the names of four “renowned citizens of 
the country” for a search committee for the reconstitution of the Election Commission. The 
opposition party recommended four former Chief Justices, including Mohammad Fazlul Karim 
(“Khaleda-led BNP delegation to meet president today,” Dhaka Tribune, 18 December 2016). This 
episode also implies that Justice Karim was not a favorable choice for the AL government. 
16 For more details on the NCG system and its problems, see Ahmed (2004), Chowdhury (2015), 
and Haque (2011). 
17 The AD declared unconstitutional the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Seventh 
Amendment in 1989, 2010, and 2011, respectively, in addition to the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Sixteen Amendment in 2011 and 2017, respectively. 
18 It has been a universal law of Bangladeshi politics since 1991 that regardless of which party is in 
power, the ruling party has a negative attitude toward the NCG system and the opposition supports it 
and demands a parliamentary election under an NCG. 
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in the AD since 2005. Incidentally, his appointment was in supersession of two senior judges, who 
were unacceptable to the government (Sinha 2018, chapter 6). Second, the AD initially handed down 
the judgement by issuing a one-page short order, eight days before the retirement of the Chief Justice, 
and the AD needed more than a year to make the full judgement public. This means that Justice 
Haque wrote his opinion after his retirement. Third, it was only two months after the short order was 
released (therefore, before the release of the full judgement) that the AL used its absolute majority in 
Parliament to pass the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act abolishing the NCG system. In fact, 
it is alleged that the detailed decision by a plurality of the court was written in line with changes 
brought about through the Fifteenth Amendment. Last but not least, some AD judges, especially 
Chief Justice Haque and Justice Muzammel Hossain, were widely known to be pro-AL because of 
their track records. In addition, judging from his memoir, Justice Sinha seems to have had a cordial 
relationship with the AL and its leaders. For example, before he was appointed to the Chief Justice, 
Justice Sinha felt that “under the circumstances then prevailing in the country, there was no reason 
on her [Prime Minister’s] part not to appoint me as the Chief Justice” (Sinha 2018, chapter 10). 
For the Sixteenth Amendment Case, on the other hand, Justice Sinha saw that Prime Minister 
Hasina pressured him to side with the government (i.e. to declare the constitutional amendment 
unlawful) in a secret meeting also attended by the President, the Law Minister, and the Attorney 
General. He suspects that some of the other judges were also pressed to render a verdict favourable 
to the government (Sinha 2018, chapter 27). However, the AD unanimously declared the Sixteenth 
Amendment unconstitutional, and the verdict was denounced harshly by the government and lauded 
by the opposition. This stood in sharp contrast to the Fifteenth Amendment Case, in which the AD 
declared the amendment unconstitutional, and the verdict was endorsed by the government and 
criticised by the opposition. This contrast supports our argument that judges across the political 
spectrum were very keen to uphold the independence of the judiciary, given that the Sixteenth 
Amendment Case was directly related to judicial autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch.19 
Moreover, a closer look at the voting patterns of judges in the two cases vindicates another claim 
we made above, that judges could be selected who were neither pliable nor favourable to the ruling 
party. The Fifteenth Amendment Case ended up as a 4-3 split decision; while the judges who were 
suspected to be pro-AL formed the majority, three judges, including Justice Miah, dissented. It is 
surely not a coincidence that Justice Haque has been the Chairman of the Law Commission since 
                                                   
19 The independence of the judiciary was an issue in the Thirteenth Amendment Case as well. Some 
studies also point out that after the introduction of the NCG system, judicial appointments became 
more politicized because successive governments got more eager to handpick the Chief Justices and 
other judges of the AD, calculating the future possibility that they would become the Chief Advisor 
of an NCG (Chowdhury 2015, 223-224; Jahan and Shahan 2014, 227). Nevertheless, as Islam (2012, 
86-87) rightly points out, “the provisions relating to caretaker government cannot be blamed as 
destroying the independence of the judges of the Supreme Court.” The minority judges also said that 
the Thirteenth Amendment did not destroy any basic structures of the Constitution.  
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July 2013 and that three other judges in the majority were promoted to the Chief Justice, two of 
whom (Md. Muzammel Hossain and Syed Mahmud Hossain) superseded the senior-most judges 
(Table 1).20 In contrast, the verdict of the Sixteenth Amendment Case was unanimous, and all the 
judges ruled against the amendment to Article 96, including Justice Sinha and Justice Syed Mahmud 
Hossain, who were part of the majority in the Fifteenth Amendment Case. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper shows that while the executive branch has interfered in the judiciary, especially through 
the extensive politicisation of judicial appointments, it does not have full control of the Supreme 
Court in Bangladesh. We argue that there are two main reasons for this gap: (1) judges across the 
political spectrum have been very keen to uphold judicial autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch 
(probably for self-serving reasons), and (2) judges who were neither pliable nor favourable to the 
ruling party were selected because of not only partisan interests and the political ideologies of judges 
but also because of other important factors. In light of the above, we can properly understand why 
the Supreme Court struck down the Sixteenth Amendment over the government’s objections. Taken 
together, the judiciary of Bangladesh is not characterised solely by either politicisation or 
judicialisation (or a transition from the former to the latter), and therefore this sort of dichotomous 
thinking is not appropriate in looking at the relationship between the executive and judicial branches 
in Bangladesh. Accordingly, we need to examine important legal issues on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account both the political and judicial contexts. 
  However, with that said, it seems that as the judiciary has faced mounting pressure from the 
government, politicisation of the judiciary—and possibly its subjugation―has played a more 
dominant role in recent years. As pointed out in Section 3, the number of judges superseded by 
junior colleagues has skyrocketed recently, and this trend reflects AL government’s more blatantly 
arbitrary decisions in judicial appointments. One plausible explanation for this bold move is that 
because the AL had “landslide victories” in a virtually uncontested election in January 2014 and in 
an allegedly rigged election in December 2018,21 the current regime has become increasingly 
                                                   
20 In addition to higher positions in the Supreme Court, post-retirement appointments to the Law 
Commission and other public offices have also been used to lure judges to give judgments favorable 
for the authorities concerned. 
21 In the 2014 parliamentary election, the BNP boycotted and its long-time ally the Jamaat-e-Islami 
was barred from participating. As a result, 154 out of 300 seats were not contested and turnout was 
reported to be as low as 15 to 20 percent (Riaz 2014, 129). For the 2018 parliamentary election, in 
which the AL-led coalition won 288 out of 300 seats, there were many allegations about the absence 
of a level-playing field and organized electoral fraud (e.g. voter intimidation and vote rigging). See, 
for example, “Bangladesh election: PM Sheikh Hasina wins landslide in disputed vote,” BBC News, 
31 December 2018. 
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authoritarian. In fact, it has stifled dissent by both legal and extralegal means,22 and consequently it 
has faced less criticism from the opposition, the media, civil organisations, intellectuals, and the bar. 
It is yet another manifestation of this dismal trend that the AL government forced the ‘rebel’ Chief 
Justice to leave the country and resign without invoking Article 96 of the Constitution. 
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M. H. Rahman 1976-05-08 1985-12-26 1995-02-01 1995-04-30 0.2 0 NA
A. T. M. Afzal 1977-04-15 1985-12-26 1995-05-01 1999-05-31 4.1 0 NA
Mustafa Kamal 1979-04-09 1989-12-01 1999-06-01 1999-12-31 0.6 0 NA
Latifur Rahman 1979-11-21 1990-01-15 2000-01-01 2001-02-28 1.2 0 NA
Mahmudul Amin Chowdhury 1987-01-27 1999-06-28 2001-03-01 2002-06-17 1.3 0 NA
Mainur Reza Chowdhury 1990-01-29 2000-11-08 2002-06-18 2003-06-22 1.0 0 NA
K. M. Hasan 1991-07-13 2002-01-20 2003-06-23 2004-01-26 0.6 2 NA
Syed J. R. Mudassir Husain 1992-02-18 2002-03-05 2004-01-27 2007-02-28 3.1 2 NA
Md. Ruhul Amin 1992-02-18 2001-01-11 2007-03-01 2008-05-31 1.3 0 NA
M. M. Ruhul Amin 1994-02-10 2003-07-13 2008-06-01 2009-12-22 1.6 1 NA
Md. Tafazzul Islam 1994-02-10 2003-08-27 2009-12-23 2010-02-07 0.1 1 NA
Mohammad Fazlul Karim 1992-11-01 2001-05-15 2010-02-08 2010-09-29 0.6 0 NA
A.B.M. Khairul Haque 1998-04-27 2009-07-16 2010-09-30 2011-05-17 0.6 2 NA
Md. Muzammel Hossain 1998-04-27 2009-07-16 2011-05-18 2015-01-16 3.7 1 NA
Surendra Kumar Sinha 1999-10-24 2009-07-16 2015-01-17 2017-11-11 2.8 0 Resignation
Syed Mahmud Hossain 2001-02-22 2011-02-23 2018-02-02 - - 1 -
Notes : The dark gray entries correspond to periods of when an AL government was in power, and the light gray entries correspond to periods
of when a BNP government was in power. The retirement age of Supreme Court judges was raised from 65 to 67 years old by the Constitution
(Fourteenth Amendment) Act, passed in May 2004.
Source : Website of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/web/) and Supreme Court of Bangladesh (2016). The
number of AD judges superseded by a judge appointed as the Chief Justice was calculated by authors.
Name
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From To Years
Mohammad Abdur Rouf 1982-01-29 1995-06-08 1999-02-01 3.7 1 NA
Mohammad Ismailuddin Sarker 1983-12-30 1995-06-08 1996-01-20 0.6 1 Death
Bimalendu Bikash Roy Chowdhury 1985-07-02 1996-05-11 2000-11-01 4.5 0 NA
A. M. Mahmudur Rahman 1985-12-26 1999-02-01 2000-12-14 1.9 0 NA
Mahmudul Amin Chowdhury (CJ) 1987-01-27 1999-06-28 2002-06-17 3.0 2 NA
Kazi Ebadul Hoque 1990-01-29 2000-01-19 2001-01-01 1.0 2 NA
Mainur Reza Chowdhury (CJ) 1990-01-29 2000-11-08 2003-06-22 2.6 2 NA
Mohammad Gholam Rabbani 1992-02-18 2001-01-11 2002-01-10 1.0 1 NA
Md. Ruhul Amin (CJ) 1992-02-18 2001-01-11 2008-05-31 7.4 2 NA
Mohammad Fazlul Karim (CJ) 1992-11-01 2001-05-15 2010-09-29 9.4 3 NA
K. M. Hasan (CJ) 1991-07-13 2002-01-20 2004-01-26 2.0 0 NA
Syed J. R. Mudassir Husain (CJ) 1992-02-18 2002-03-05 2007-02-28 5.0 0 NA
Abu Sayeed Ahammed 1992-11-01 2002-03-05 2003-08-23 1.5 0 NA
Kazi A. T. Monowaruddin 1994-02-10 2002-06-25 2002-07-15 0.1 0 NA
Md. Fazlul Haque 1994-02-10 2002-07-17 2003-06-30 1.0 0 NA
Hamidul Haque 1994-02-10 2003-06-29 2003-12-20 0.5 0 NA
M.M. Ruhul Amin (CJ) 1994-02-10 2003-07-13 2009-12-22 6.4 1 NA
Md. Tafazzul Islam (CJ) 1994-02-10 2003-08-27 2010-02-07 6.5 1 NA
M. A. Aziz 1996-06-01 2004-01-07 2006-09-30 2.7 1 NA
Amirul Kabir Chowdhury 1996-06-01 2004-02-26 2007-06-30 3.3 1 NA
Md. Joynul Abedin 1996-06-01 2006-08-24 2009-12-31 3.4 3 NA
Md. Hassan Ameen 1996-06-01 2007-03-21 2008-07-03 1.3 0 NA
Md. Abdul Matin 1996-06-01 2007-09-19 2010-12-25 3.3 1 NA
Shah Abu Nayeem Mominur Rahman 1996-06-01 2009-03-08 2011-05-12 2.2 0 Resignation
(Alhaj) Md. Abdul Aziz 1998-04-27 2009-03-08 2009-12-31 0.8 0 NA
B.K. Das 1998-04-27 2009-07-16 2010-04-10 0.7 0 NA
A.B.M. Khairul Haque (CJ) 1998-04-27 2009-07-16 2011-05-17 1.8 0 NA
Md. Muzammel Hossain (CJ) 1998-04-27 2009-07-16 2015-01-16 5.5 0 NA
Surendra Kumar Sinha (CJ) 1999-10-24 2009-07-16 2017-11-11 8.3 0 Resignation
Md. Abdul Wahhab Miah 1999-10-24 2011-02-23 2018-02-02 6.9 0 Resignation
Nazmun Ara Sultana (f) 2000-05-28 2011-02-23 2017-07-07 6.4 0 NA
Syed Mahmud Hossain (CJ) 2001-02-22 2011-02-23 - - 0 -
Muhammad Imman Ali 2001-02-22 2011-02-23 - - 0 -
Muhammed Mamataz Uddin Ahmed 1999-10-24 2011-05-16 2011-12-31 0.6 0 NA
Md. Shamsul Huda 2001-02-22 2011-05-16 2012-11-02 1.5 0 NA
Mohammad Anwarul Haque 2001-07-03 2013-03-31 2014-04-09 1.0 0 NA
Siddiqur Rahman Miah 2002-07-29 2013-03-31 2013-06-02 0.2 3 NA
Hasan Foez Siddique 2009-03-25 2013-03-31 - - 38 -
AHM Shamsuddin Choudhury 2001-07-03 2013-03-31 2015-10-02 2.5 38 NA
Mirza Hussain Haider 2001-07-03 2016-02-08 - - 1 -
Md. Nizamul Huq 2001-07-03 2016-02-08 2017-03-14 1.1 29 NA
Mohammad Bazlur Rahman 2001-07-03 2016-02-08 2017-01-01 0.9 29 Death
Zinat Ara (f) 2003-04-27 2018-10-09 - - 3 -
Abu Bakar Siddiquee 2009-06-30 2018-10-09 - - 23 -
Md. Nuruzzaman 2009-06-30 2018-10-09 - - 23 -
Notes : The dark gray entries correspond to periods of when an AL government was in power, and the light gray entries correspond to
periods of when a BNP government was in power. The retirement age of Supreme Court judges was raised from 65 to 67 years old by the
Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, passed in May 2004. (CJ) indicates that the judges became the Chief Justice. (f) indicates that
the judges are female.
Source : Website of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/web/) and Supreme Court of Bangladesh (2016).
The number of HCD judges superseded by a judge elevated to the Appellate Division was calculated by authors.
Table 2   AD Judges appointed after 1990
Name
Date of
elevation to
the HCD
Tenure
shortened
because of
Number of
HCD judges
superseded
Tenure at the AD
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 AL
 BNP
 Others
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
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20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
Source : Website of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/web/) and Supreme
Court of Bangladesh (2016).
Notes : This figure shows the composition of AD judges for each year (at the end of a year). Dark gray, light
gray, and dotted cells represent judges appointed to the AD by an AL government, a BNP government, and
other governments (either the Jatiya Party government or the military-backed NCG), respectively.
Figure 1  Composition of AD Judges, 1991-2018
BNP AL BNP NCG AL AL
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A.B.M. Khairul Haque 1998-04-27 2009-07-16 2011-05-17   Unconstitutional* -
Md. Muzammel Hossain 1998-04-27 2009-07-16 2015-01-16 Unconstitutional -
Surendra Kumar Sinha 1999-10-24 2009-07-16 2017-11-11   Unconstitutional*   Unconstitutional*
Md. Abdul Wahhab Miah 1999-10-24 2011-02-23 2018-02-02   Constitutional*   Unconstitutional*
Nazmun Ara Sultana 2000-05-28 2011-02-23 2017-07-07 Constitutional Unconstitutional
Syed Mahmud Hossain 2001-02-22 2011-02-23 - Unconstitutional   Unconstitutional*
Muhammad Imman Ali 2001-02-22 2011-02-23 -   Constitutional*   Unconstitutional*
Hasan Foez Siddique 2009-03-25 2013-03-31 - -   Unconstitutional*
Mirza Hussain Haider 2001-07-03 2016-02-08 - -   Unconstitutional*
Source : Website of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/web/) and Supreme Court of
Bangladesh (2016).
Notes : The dark gray entries correspond to periods of when an AL government was in power. * indicates that the judge wrote
his own judgement. A.B.M. Khairul Haque and Surendra Kumar Sinha were the Chief Justices in the Fifteenth Amendment Case
and the Sixteenth Amendment Case, respectively.
Date of
elevation to
the HCD
Voting Patterns of Judges
Table 3  Voting Patterns of AD Judges 
Tenure at the AD
From To
13th Amendment
Case (2011-05-10)
16th Amendment
Case (2017-07-03)
Name
 
 
 
